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STATE OF UTAH 
8TATE OF UTAH, 
In the IntereSJt of: 
BABY GIRL McMURTREY, 
vs. 
JAMES N. THOMAS, 
Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
11607 
The Second District Juvenile Coulit, the Honorable 
Regnal W. Garff presiding, terminated a11 parental rights 
of the appellant James N. Thomas, in his daughter, Baby 
Gil•] McMurtrey. This is an appeal from that order. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
A petition for the permanenrt dep:civabion of all par-
ental rights of Baby Girl McMurtrey was filed in rthe Sec-
ond District Juvenile Court on December 23, 1968. Aflter 
a hearing on February 26, 1969, the matter was taken 
under advisement by the Court. On March 7, 1969 appel-
lant filed a petiltion reaffirming his paternity and request-
2 
ing custody of the child. By Decree and Order enterer: 
April 3, 1969, all parental rights of both the appellant anri 
mother of the child \Vere permanently terminated. Custiid" 
of ithe child was given the Division of Family Services un 
til placement in a suitable adoptive home. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the Juvenile Cuu1, 
Decree. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent accepts appellant's Statement of Fact 
with one major reservation. Appellant asserts that th, 
Juvenile Court's sole basis for terminating appellant's par-
ental rights in Baby Girl McMurtrey was that he was nrit 
the legal father of the child. Respondent would add the 
following facts which modify this assertion. The J uveni], 
Court was well acquainted with appellant James N. Thomas 
as evidenced by this language taken from the Order of tl11 
Juvenile Court denying custody to appellant (R. 46). 
". . . although Mr. Thomas is the putafa 
father, he is not the father and, therefore, ha: 
no rights to the child; FURTHER, this Coun 
has prevfous,ly deprived Mr. Thomas of custody 01 • 
two oither children, Vincent Andre Thomas ana 
Keith Antoine Thomas, Case Nos. 205941 and 
205942; said action was taken on September n 
1965; since that time the children have continud 
to live in foster homes and Court action has beet: 
required to for0e support payments from l\Ir. 
Thomas on behalf of the children· he still io.s unablt ' . 
to provide for these two children after 31/2 years o; 
foster case; FURTHER, it would be contrary to the 
interest of the above child ito follow the same foster 
care pattern as these other two children." 
This Order wa·s entered the same day as the Findings of 
Fact and Decree terminating appellant's parental rights. 
Judge Garff specifically found that it was in the best in-
terests of the child to terminate its parents' rights in it. 
SPc Findings of Fact (R. 44). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
TI-IE JUVENILE COURT PROPERLY TER-
MINATED A P P E L L A N T ' S PARENTAL 
RIGHTS IN BABY GIRL McMURTREY. 
A. THE JUVENILE COURT HAS THE 
POWER TO TERMINATE PARENTAL 
RIGHTS AND THE EXERCISE OF THAT 
POWER WAS PROPER UNDER THE 
FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS 
CASE. 
Appellant asserts that the Juvenile Court cannolt ap-
ply stafotes other than those enacted as a part of the J uven-
ile Com'l; Act and since (according to appellant) the sole 
basis for terminating appellant's parental rights in this 
case was Section 78-30-4, Utah Code Ann.,* Juvenile 
Comit exceeded its authority. The logical responses are 
(1) that the Juvenrile Court can apply any statute in Utah 
-
'The issue of whether the rewording of Utah Code Ann. § 78·30-4 
by the 1965 legislature changed the meaning of that statute will be 
discussed under subsection (B) infra. 
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Code Annotated in ·of the caises within its juris. 
diction, and (2) that Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4 was not 
the sole ba•sis for terminating appellant's parental rights. 
Appellant's contention that the Juvenile Court mus: 
decide its cases applying only the statutes found in Section, 
55-10-63 through 55-10-123, coHectively known as thr 
J uvenri.le Court Aot, is too unsiound to require rebuttal. 
Appellant admits that this Court has never held that the 
Juvenile Court must proceed so1'ely on ltheir own statutes 
I 
and respondent has not seen any other authority that woulu 
support such a contention. The Juvenile Court must act 
within the Constitution of the Staite of Utah and also with. 
in the statutes enacted under the Constitution unless thert 
is a conflict with a provision of the Juvenile Court Act. In 
the situation where a provision of the Code confliots with 
a proviS1ion of the Juvenile Court Act, the Juvenile Cami 
i.s free to follow its own Act. Section 55-10-77 gives the 
Juvenile Court broad jurisdiction over a number of 
jects. If the Juvenile Court could apply oniJy the law 
in ithe Juvenile Court Act, it would be severely handicappe<l 
in disposing of the cases it has j urisdic:tion over under 
55-10-77. Respondent requests that this Court rule tha1 
the Juvenile Court i1s authorized to app'1y all the statutes ln 
the Code and nat just those found in the JuvenHe Com1 
Act. 
Appellant repeatedly asserts thait the sole basis foi 
terminating his parental rights was that he was not the 
legal father of Baby Girl McMul'trey. The record indicate; 




no parental rights in another illegitimate CJhild begotten 
by him. See Thomas V. Children's Aid Society of Ogden, 
12 Utah 2d 235, 364 P. 2d 1029 (1961). Undoubtedly Judge 
Garff was aware of this faCJt and could have talmn judicial 
notice of it. 
Appellant places great emphasis on ,the pdl!icy of the 
Juvenile Court Act of strengthening family ties whenever 
possible. He emphasizes family ties (p. 13 orf Appellant's 
Brief whereas in this case the emphasis should be on the 
last two words whenever possible. In custody and termina-
tion of parental rights cases, two conflicting considerations 
must be balanced out, i.e., ( 1) the superior rights of the 
parent to his child and (2) the welfare of the child. The 
parent, except where proven unfit, has rights superior to 
all others in his CJhirld. However, the pri.ncipal and main 
must alwayis be the welfare of the child. See 
Harrison v. Harker, 44 Utah 541, 142 P. 716 (1914). In 
the situation where the famiJy is a going concern, more 
weight is given to the righlts of the parent. However, 
where, as here, ,the family is nort a normal goli.ng family, the 
welfare of ,the child should be the sole criterion. 
The Juvenile Court Act of 1965 provides: 
"'Dhe court may decree a termin:a'ffion of 'al}i} par-
entwl ri.gh.ltJs with respect Ito one or both parents iif 
the court finds that the parent or parents are unfit 
or incompetent by reason of conduot or condition 
seriously detrimental to the child. U. C. A. 55-10-
109 (1) (a). 
ti 
In the present ca'3e the mother and father of the child haii 
been married to each other, but were not marnied at thi 
time the child was conceived nor aJt the time the child wa, 
born nor at the time the termination Order was entererl 
The mother is emotionally incapable of caring for the chilU. 
The father has been denied parental rights in another ille-
daughter and has been depPived of ithe custody of 
two other children, which he is still unable to support. fr 
short, this is not a normal going family. It was in the best 
intere5t of Baby Girl McM urtrey to take her out of sud 
a family. Judge Garff, being well informed of the fatt; 
and circumstances in this case, acted within the authority 
granted him by secition 55-10-109, Utah Code Ann. when 
he terminated appellant's parental rights. 
B. THE FATHER OF AN ILLEGITIMATE 
CHILD DID NOT ACQUIRE ANY NEW 
RIGHTS IN RELATION TO SAID CHILD 
BY THE 1966 AMENDMENT OF UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78-30-4. 
Prii.or to 1966, Utah Code Annotated, 78-30-4, read in 
pertinent part: 
"A legitimate child cannot be adopted without 
the consent of its parents, if living, nor an illegiti· 
mate chiild without the ·Clonsent of its mother, ii 
living .... " 
In 1966, the statute was amended to read: 
"A child cannot he adopted without the consen: 
of each living parent having rights in relation t· 
said child .... " 
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Appellant contends tha;t ithe amendment conferred 
upon the father of an illegitimate child the right to consent 
to tile adoption of that child. The respondent conrtends that 
the amendment merely restated the law, as it has always 
existed in this State. The statute, as amended, is ambigu-
ous, and since no legislative history can be found to en-
licrllten U·S as to the legislative intent behind the amend-
b 
mcnt, it becomes the duty of this Court to construe the 
amendment consistent ·with public policy. 
The key to understanding the amendment is the phrase, 
"each living parent haV1ing rights in relation to Mid child." 
Who is a parent in this context, and whwt is the nature 
of the rights possessed by such a parent? Do&<> this statute 
deal with four people, the father and mother of a legitimate 
child and the father and mother of an illegitimate child, 
or only with three people, the father and mother of a legiti-
mate child and tihe mOlthe•r of an illegitimate cMld? The 
English case of Re M, (1955) 2 Q. B. 479, (1955) 3 Week 
L. R. 320, 51 A. L. R. 2d 488, is almost precisely :in point. 
The statute construed by the English Court of Appeal in 
that case required for adoption the consent "of every per-
son or body who is a parent or guardian of the infant or 
irho is liable by virtue of an order or agreement Ito con-
tribute to the maintenance of the infant." The Court held 
that the word "parent" in an act of Parliament does not 
include the father of an illegitimate child, unlest:S the con-
text otherwise requires. 
Prior to the rewording of Section 78-30-4, it was clear 
that the only father having rights in his child was the 
father of a legitimate chi'ld. 
"The putative father of an illegirtimate chilrJ 
occupies no recognized parternal status at common 
law or under our statutes. The law does not recog. 
nize Mm art all, ,except that i1t will make him Pav 
for rthe dhil.d's maintenance if it can find out 
he is. The only father it reoognizes as having am 
rights is the farther of a legitimate ch!ild." 12 Utali 
2d at 239. 
Since the law wa'.S clear that the father of an illegitimate 
chiild didn't occupy parentail status in relation to thait child 
and didn't have any rights in re1wtion to thwt child, it 
perfectly consis,tent for the Legislarture to use the language,, 
"each living parent having rights in relartion to said child." 
This phrase covered only those persons 1who occupied rec· 
ognized pa'l'ental startus, namely the father and mother of 
a 'legitimarte chiiJd and ithe mother of an illegitimate child. 
It is a settled rule of startulbory construction that a word may 
take a particular meaning according to the context ana 
subject matter of the statute in which it is used. Am. Jur., 
Statutes § § 24 7 and 292. If ,the Legislature had intendeil 
to change the law and include the faJther of an Hleg]timak 
chiM as a "parent" whose consent was necessary, then the 
lJegis1}'aiture w10uld have done so in clear, unequivocal Jan· 
guage. The 1966 amendment of Section 78-30-4 was no! 
intended to confer any rights thart had niot existed pred· 
ously. The word "parent," as msred in the amendment, re 
fers only to the mother and father of a legitimate chila 
and the mother of an megirtiimate child. In the context 01 
78-30-4, the fafuer of an iHegii·tima'tJe child is not a "parent." 
The trend in the law is to eliminate all distinction be-
tween legitimate and illegitimaJte children. Possibly the 
reason for rewording the statute in question here was to 
eliminate the word "illegitimate" therefrom. The law has 
rightfully recognized that classificwtions which deprive the 
illeg·itilnate child of rights enjoyed by the legitimate child 
·;in\R.te equal protection of the laws. However, giving the 
illegitimate child the rights in relation 1Jo his natural father 
that the legitimate child has in relation to his natural father 
doesn't necessarily mean that the father of an illegitimate 
child is being endowed with the same rights as the father 
of R- legitimate child.* 
Good reasons exist for conferring upon the illegitimate 
child the same rights enjoyed by the legitimate child, but 
for sound public policy reasons the father of an illegiti-
mate child should not enjoy the same rights in relation to 
his child as the father of a legitimate child does to his. The 
law favors making children legitimate and encourages ac-
tion designed to effectuate this result. To recognize the 
natural father of an illegitimate child as one having rights 
in relation to such child, even though through legal process, 
rnluntary or involuntary, the man has not legitimated the 
child, would be to grant the man the rights of parenthood 
1dthout shackling him with any of the responsibilities. In 
'Illegitimate children can now maintain an action for their mother's 
wrongful death, (Leuy v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 68 [ 1968]), and the 
mother of an illegitimate child can maintain an action for the child's 
wrongful death (Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Ins. Co., 
391 U. S. 73, [ 1968]). However, the father of an illegitimate child 
should not be allowed to acknowledge the child after its death and 
bring a wrongful death action under the Glona doctrine. 
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such a situation the man could refuse to comsent to ti J1 
adoption of the child on one hand and on the other refusf 
to suppor.t the child himself since he would be under n
1 
legal obl:igation to do so. Such a policy would be sociall\ 
unwise and extremely disquieting to the adoptive and pros. 
pective parents in this State. 
The father of an illegitimate child has no rights in the 
child. 
"The mother of an illegitimate child ha-q bo!f1 
rights and obligations toward'.S it ... The fathrr 
af a bastard, however, has under our law no right1 
in respect of it at all and to the best of my beliei 
he never has h1ad." Re M, 51 A. L. R. 2d at 495. 
'Ilhe above quoted language accurately states the law on 
this issue in the State of Utah. See Thomas v. Children's 
Aid of Ogden, supra. About the only rights which 
father of an illegitimaJte ch:ild has in relation to such 
child are rights of visifation, and these rights are subject 
to the best interests and welfare of the child. See 15 A. L 
R. 3rd 887. The cases which speak of the father's right 
in his illegitimate chiid as being paramount to all the work 
except 1fue mdther's are cases in whioh the father sough: 
custody of rthe child. Slee Harrison v. Harker, suprn 
In the situation where the falther want'S to take his illegiti· 
mate child intJo his home and support it, and in effect Jegiti· 
mate it his right to do so should supersede the rights ol 
any other person or organization, except the child's mother 
provided it is in the best interest of the child. But the 
Staite of Utah is firmly commi1tted to the rule that the 
welfave of the child outweighs the legal rights of his W 
11 
ents. See Harrison V. Harker, supra. In the present case 
appcllarnt sough:t custody of his illegitimaite daughter, but 
Judg-e Garff decided it would be in the bestt interest of the 
child to place her in the custody of the Division of Family 
Serrices. Whatever rights appellant may have had in his 
illegitimate daughter in this case, they were subordinate 
to the best interests of the child. 
Respondent requests this Court to construe Utah Code 
Annotated, 78-30-4, as amended, as merely a restatement 
of the Jaw as announced by this Court in Thomas v. Child-
; m's A1:d Society of Ogden, supra. If the father of an 
illegitima:te child wants to become a parent having legal 
rights in relation to tha:t child, let him legitimate the child 
and assume the concommitarnt parental duties. The legal 
rights of parenthood are and should be inseparably con-
nected with its legal duties and responsibilities. 
C. APPELLANT DID NOT LEGITIMATE 
BABY GIRL McMURTREY UNDER THE 
LEGITIMATION ST AT UTE IS OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH. 
Utah has three legitimation statutes. Utah Code An-
notated 77-60-14 legitimates the child when the parents 
many after the child's birth. Utah Code Ann. 7 4-4-10 
legitimizes the child for purposes of inheritance. Utah 
Code Ann. 78-30-12 legitimates the child for all purposes, 
if 'the natural father publicly acknowledges the child, takes 
it into his family, and treats it as a legitimate child. Ap-
pellant cla'ims that his acknowledgmen't of Baby Girl Mc-
Mu1ircy should have legitimated the child since he was 
12 
prevented from complying with the other conditions set 
out in the statute. The law, however, rs clearly againit 
appellant on this pc>int. In order to legitimate an illegit. 
mate chHd, the technical requiremenits of the legitimatini 
statute must be srtriotly followed. Utah's statute require: 
acknowledgment, plus taking the child into the family, pJu, 
treating it ais a legi1timate child. See In re Carr's Estalf. 
31 Utah 57, 86 P. 757 (1906). Failure to comply with al 
three conditions resuLts in the chHd remaiirring illegitimat> 
even though the natural father des/ires to legitimate it a11 ,; 
tries to comply with all the necessary statutory condition; 
but is prevented from doing so. See In re Adoption 0 
Irby, 37 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1964). 
It may be unfortunate that the State of Utah doesn 
have a legitimation statute similar to that of Arizona whid 
makes cMldren the legirtJimate chlildren of their natura: 
parents. The acknowledgment of an illegitimate child br 
its father would then be all that is necessary t· 
legitimalte the child. Requ:iring the father to take the ch.ii 
into his home in addi'ti:on to the acknowledgment will resul' 
in .the children remaining 1iHegirtimate contrary to the in· 
tention of the par!!Jies and in most instances contrary to !ht 
intterest of the State. Some examples of situations whet' 
the child will not be legitimated even though all 
desire to confer status on the child are: (1) 
the present siltuation, where the father is prevented from 
taking the child into his home, (2) where the 
married and his Wife refuses to consent to having th, 
I 
f, 
child in the home, (3) where the father i1s unma!IT'ied and 
has no home to take the child into, and ( 4) where the 
mother, who has priior right to the lega:l custody of the 
child, refuses to allow the father to take the child into his 
home. 
Serious questions now exist as to how a child can be 
Jeg-itimate in Utah for purposes other than inheritance 
where the parents of the child do not marry and where the 
father acknowledges the child as his own but does not take 
it into his family. However, respondent must assert that 
Utah Code Ann. 78-30-12 is clear in requiring acknowledg-
ment plus the other conditions, and any change based on 
social considerations would probably come from the Legis-
lature rather than by forc1ing upon the present statute a 
meaning which its clear wording will not accommodate. 
CONCLUSION 
A man who begets an iHegitimarte child and does not 
legitima:te that child is not a "parent" having the right to 
consent to the adoption of that child under the common law 
1 
and &tatutes of the State of Utah. Appell:ant's efforlfJs to 
legitima:te Ms daughter were insufficiient under the legiti-
mation statutes of the StaJte of Utah. The best interests 
of the child predominate over any rights of its parenits, 
and under the facits and circumstances of this case, Judge 
14 
Garff acted wfilihin his authority when he terminated 
pellant's parenta!l rights. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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Attorney General 
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Assistant Attorney General 
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